Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. 
In a letter to General Marshall, Ike confesses that "post-armistice matters do not occupy any great share of my thoughts jr4 We will see I that Eisenhower's guidance from the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) was concise and
Germany-focused
Yet after the Yalta Conference, Eisenhower clearly understood that the Sovrets would occupy Berlin after the armrstrce, and this confirmed his reluctance to race toward the German capital Bradley estimated that tt would cost the Allies 100,000 casualties to seize Berlin, "a pretty stiff price to pay for a prestige oblectrve, especrally when we've got to fall back and let the other fellow take over 'j5 iEIsenhower well knew the polrtrcal lmplicatrons of his operational and tactical decrsrons He was acutely aware of the necessity to give the British a key role In the ultimate European victory And almost all of Eisenhower's associates agreed that he was more tolerant of Montgomery than he should have been ' We will discuss Ike's I Ideas about coalition warfare shortly ,"The hub of all power and movement, on whtch everything depends" so goes / I the Clausewrtzran definrtron 8 Prior to D-Day, the CCS gave Eisenhower the followlng drrectrve "You WI// enfer the conf/t?enf of Europe and, m conjuncfron wlfh the ofher Al/led Nafiorjs, undertake operafions almed sf fhe heart of Germafly and the desflruction of her Armed forces a As Eisenhower described In his memoirs "This purpose of destroying enemy forces was always our guiding principle, geographical points were considered only I; relation to their importance to the enemy In the conduct of his operations or to us as centers of supply and communlcatlons
In proceeding to the destruction of enemy / armies and air forces "' I Clearly, Eisenhower saw the Wehrmacht as Germany's center of gravity
As discussed earlier, the broad-front strategy gave the greatest chance of completely destroying the German Army Eisenhower "We wanted to bring all our strength against him, all of It mobile and all of It contnbutmg directly to the complete annrhr atron of his field forces 'lo I Intellect and determination are high on Clausewltz's list, "an intellect that, even rn the dabkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the Inner light which leads to truth, and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever It may lead a23 The clearest example of Ike's Intellect and determination IS his reaction to the German counterattack tn the Ardennes At a meeting just after the attack had begun, Eisenhower's commanders and staff were ' glum, depressed, (and) embarrassed, as they should have been, given the magnitude of the intelligence failure and the faulty dlsposrtlons of their troops In order to maintain hopeless offensive north and south of Yhe Ardennes Eisenhower walked in, looked disapprovingly at the downcast generals, and boldly declared, 'The present situation IS to be regarded as one of opportunrty for us and not of disaster There will be only cheerful faces at this conference table Eisenhower's declslveness ,and Patton's boldness Eere electrifying Their mood quickly spread throughout the system Now the Germans were out of their fixed fortlficatlons, out in the open where American artillery, Infantry, and fighterpombers could destroy them *' Deaslveness, the Idea of a rapid and accurate declslon also ranks high on Clausdwitz's list 26 Stephen Ambrose on the Battle of the Bulge "Hitler had assumed a slow A/nencan response because he was certain It would take Eisenhower two or three days to recognize the extent of the threat and that he would not be willing to call off his offensives north and south of the Ardennes until he had checked with Churchill and
Roosebelt
Eisenhower proved him wrong on both points I'*'
And finally we come to strength of will, that determlnatton to limit the agonies of doubt And the penis of hesitation 28 Debates about strategy aside, the point that stands out IS that Eisenhower continued to make the key operational decisions and enforce his will, despite heavy pressure, including frequent personal visits and messages from '13 Clausewitz, On War, 102 24 Ambrose, Chzen Soldrers, 2C 8 '5 Ambrhse, Chzen Soldrem, 200 " Clausewitz, On War, 102 Church111 In the end the greatest support he had, the support that was really deaslve, Murra$, G E Patrick Ejsenhower Versus Montgomery Westport, CT Praeger, 1996 
